If you're interested in a helpful, clear description of the field of Paul studies these days, especially with respect to justification, you can do no better than Andy Johnson's "Navigating Justification: Conversing with Paul.”

Andy is a professor of New Testament at Nazarene Theological Seminary and all around good guy.

This is the part I’ve been dreading, because I know Douglas will hate me for it, cast aspersions upon me for “not understanding” the importance of the work, etc. But here it is…

This would have been an incomparably better book had the first 466 pages not been appended to the front.

1. Problems with “Justification Theory”

a. An early phase in Campbell’s argument is to lay out “justification theory”–a soteriological model that moves “forward” from an apprehension of God’s just displeasure at the sin in the world through a person’s recognition of this to an introduction of Christ as the means of deliverance.

Campbell’s articulation of this position is exceedingly detailed and complex. As I mentioned in one of my earlier reviews of the volume, it becomes so detailed that I end up failing to recognize this “theory” as belonging to any real life person.

b. In response to this “straw man” objection, Campbell shows how justification theory(hereafter “JT”) actually corresponds to a particular reading of Romans. However, this is no answer to the straw man objection, because the theory itself is so clearly derived from what Campbell takes to be JT’s reading of Romans 1-4.

c. The closest that I can see someone comes to affirming something like Campbell’s “JT” is a classic post-Reformation justification soteriology. But tellingly, Campbell has backed off of his previous identification of this position as the “Lutheran” reading of Paul. The shoe doesn’t quite fit the Lutherans, and it leaves me wondering who, in fact, it is supposed to fit.

d. As a further point along this line of argument, as I said, the closest approximation of JT that I can come up with is a Reformation-influenced soteriology. But interestingly, Campbell finds that strong statements of election and/or predestination are incompatible with JT, which he takes to be entirely voluntarist. In other words, the Calvinistic passages in Paul are incompatible with a Reformed-like, classic “justification theory”!

e. This leads to a final problem with JT, that will be related to my next area of critique: the position is not handled and understood “from the inside out,” as an actual Reformed commentator has made the point and developed the argument. Instead, it is handled from “the outside in,” developing a theory that entails any number of points that “must” be held given certain other commitments–and so Campbell ends up critiquing a system of his own devising rather than the position of any (group of) commentator(s).

f. This weakness of the book is not just nit-picking! Campbell asserts that “JT” is not only the dominant reading of Romans (?!), but that it is the best, most credible alternative to his, that his reading solves all of its problems, and that one must therefore from this point on always adopt Campbell’s reading because of the way that it solves all of JT’s conundrums. Everyone else has underestimated the problem, thereby trapping themselves in too facile solutions, and so we need this entire project to set things right (931-36). Campbell simply won’t convince many to follow him down that road. In part, this is because of problem 2..

2. Problems with Everyone Else

After working through the problems with justification theory, Campbell turns to recent efforts to reread Paul–efforts of Stendhal, Sanders, Watson, Dunn, Wright. Astonishingly, after reading through all of these, and even noting how their readings solve some of the problems Campbell perceives in JT!, Campbell dismisses these all as not only offering inadequate solutions to how we read Romans, but as offering no improvement whatever on JT! He concludes that JT is really the only reading that has any claim to coherence and viability as an alternative to his–but that after listing over 50 problems with it!

In truth, Campbell’s book builds very much on these earlier studies, is simply one step further along the path of understanding Romans than several of these other readers have been able to come up with, and is not successful at establishing the either/or alternative (Campbell or JT) that it strives so ardently to do.

In light of this (which takes us to p. 466), my assessment is that the first 1/2 of the book weakens the overall argument by trying to do too much. Perhaps some of the more important elements (helping us realize how deeply embedded certain JT readings are in church history, for example) might have been covered in 20 pages, but otherwise I recommend that the reader start reading on p. 467.

3. Problems with “the Teacher”

Campbell suggests that the strong denunciations that begin in Romans 1:18ff. are not Paul’s own position, but the view of “a teacher” whom he is opposing. I just have a couple of thoughts on this, issues that need to be addressed before Campbell’s reading will be largely persuasive:

a. Campbell does not give a strong explanation of the γάρ (“for”) that begins a new “voice” in the letter. This is problematic not only because the connector seems to conjunct 1:17 and 1:18 but also because elsewhere in Romans the contrasting voice in a diatribe is clearly marked by rhetorical questions and the like.

b. Part of the reason why we need “a teacher” is because otherwise so much of the argument looks mis-directed, mid-representative of Judaism, etc. But once one has established a plausible theory for how Paul’s critiques could have a viable target, then the need for that particular argument is undone! No longer do we have to see these arguments as lacking a plausible object.

c. Campbell wants to reject much of the material in Rom 1-2 as incompatible with Paul’s thought, and yet we find those very same components in other letters and clearly in Paul’s own voice: God’s wrath, judgment based on works, opposition to homosexuality, condemnation of various stereotyped sins, etc.

While there is certainly a theology with which each of these is incompatible–but apparently it’s not Paul’s. And with this, much of Campbell’s project starts to crumble under its own weight. The book is clearly making a number of decisions based on theology, theological compatibility and coherence, etc. But as much as I’d like to follow down the road that Campbell has cleared for us, the fact that so much of the theology explained away as belonging to “the teacher” is actually Paul’s theology elsewhere raises serious questions as to whether that road will take us to the apostle himself.

I do not wish to end on this note, however, From p. 601 through the end the book presents a masterful reading of Romans, many parts of which will no doubt win the day as exegetical roadmaps to the understanding of the letter. The world of Pauline scholarship is shifting, advancing by fits and starts, and Campbell’s work is an important step both in confirming what has come thus far and in taking the next step forward.

Campbell begins his chapter on Romans 4 with a discussion of how it fits together with Rom 3:27-31, in particular, the way that these verses at the end of ch. 3 entail a diatribe in which Paul’s position is set out against an opposing one. Significantly for interpretation of Rom 4, the end of Rom 3 outlines the argument Paul then takes up. (In general, this is nothing new–it has been recognized by numerous commentators, especially over the past 30 years.)

The substantive point that Campbell makes here that needs to be more widely recognized than it sometimes is comes to this: “Paul simply overrules the… gospel of works in 3:28″ (718). In other words, Paul doesn’t argue based on its failure that this “other gospel” doesn’t work; nor does he argue based on scriptural precedent; instead, he argues based on what he simply knows God to have done in Christ (which Paul explained in 3:21-26). In other words, Paul’s refutation of “works” is thoroughly Christological and a posteriori. Ed Sanders couldn’t have said it better himself.

Campbell counters some traditional readings of “reckoning righteous” with his own interpretation (though it’s not as devastating to most Reformed readers of Rom 4 as he intimates): “… in view of Abraham’s trust God promised to do something for him in the future; a divine check was written to the patriarch that in this case had clearly not been worked for or earned” (732).

When Abraham’s faith comes more fully into view, in Rom 4:13-16a, Campbell says the following:

…we receive here a hint that the state characterized by πίστις is far more complex and powerful than an emphasis simply on πίστις itself might suggest if it is read in terms of an individual’s decision! It somehow denotes a new reality–and presumably through involvement in the narrative of Christ. (735)

The pay-off of taking the subjective genitive reading becomes increasingly clear as the volume goes on.

But the heart of the argument is the latter half of Romans 4, which Campbell says has been “generally neglected by the interpretive tradition” (735; of course, dutiful readers will know that “generally” isn’t “entirely”).

In dealing with Abraham as father, Paul says in Rom 4:17 that he placed his trust in God who gives life to the dead and can call the things that are not so that they are, and he goes on to underscore that this “predication corresponds directly to the statements of v. 19 that Abraham’s loins and Sara’s womb were dead” (737). Or, if you prefer Kirk:

The particular predication of God that Paul employs to describe the object of Abraham’s faith corresponds exactly to the nature of the plight that God’s promise to Abraham was intended to solve:… Abraham was dead… Abraham believed these promises despite the condition of his body, which “had already died” (ἤδη νενεκρωμένον, v. 19) and despite the “deadness” (νέκρωσις, v. 19) of Sarah’s womb. (Unlocking Romans, 72)

Looking forward to the end of the chapter, Campbell argues that this resurrection faith, focused on Isaac’s birth, is the linchpin for Paul’s connection with Christian faith as articulated at the end of the chapter (Romans 4:24-25). They, too, will be justified when they believe in the God who gives life from the dead (738). Or, in case anyone out there really does prefer Kirk, “In v. 24 Paul indicates that the means by which the group declared righteous is determined is belief in God who has raised Jesus, just as Abraham believed in the God who would raise him from death by means of his seed [i.e., Isaac]” (Unlocking Romans, 75).

Campbell highlights two key narrative dynamics for making sense of Rom 4. They are Abraham’s πίστις and the resurrecting God. These are “the interpretive keys to Genesis 17″ as Paul reads it (743). “Paul substantiates [his] claims by casting Abraham’s faith in such a way that it, like Christian faith, is resurrection faith” (Unlocking Romans, 80).

Campbell wraps up the exegetical portion of his study of Rom 4 by giving apt attention to Rom 4:23-25, especially its focus on the place of resurrection in Paul’s argument.

These verses reach back to 3:21-16, as well as 1:16-17, and 1:2-4 (746; cf. Unlocking Romans, 81-83). Christ’s fidelity is met by life, Hab 2:4 declares–this is what Campbell refers to as the “matyrological narrative” of Paul’s gospel, and it is reiterated in 4:25.

Resurrection is especially important in extending salvation: it offers deliverance from a realm characterized by transgressions and death (747). Here, Campbell is clearly paving the way for joining Rom 4 with the remainder of the letter.

Throughout, I am once again happy to find that Campbell has continued to work out with exacting detail the importance of the Christological narrative of Jesus’ death and resurrection for Paul’s argument–especially the emphasis on the latter. I hope that my cheeky juxtaposition of our books indicates that the positive arguments of the two reinforce each other to a considerable extent, and that the centrality of resurrection is not something to be lightly brushed aside. It is a crucial component to a gospel narrative that testifies to the revelation of the righteousness of God.

Once again, I’ll summarize with what is sure to be a huge disappointment to my readers: I agree with everyone else. The book is fantastic in its positive program of the apocalyptic reading, especially from Romans 3:20 onward, and unpersuasive in what precedes.

Today I want to cover two topics: the connotation of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ (righteousness of God) and Campbell’s discussion of Abraham in Romans 4. Unfortunately, however, this “want” is not fulfilled. Only the first is covered!

1. δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ

Campbell begins by suggesting that the notion of God’s righteousness is simultaneously a statement about God’s being and God’s action–and that the action tied to God’s righteousness in this case has to do with Christ (680). Taking this angle, Campbell is able to argue that there is little significance in the shift from “righteousness of God” and “righteousness from God” inasmuch as both pertain to Christ. God’s righteousness is a single, saving, liberating, life-giving and therefore eschatological or resurrecting act.

(Once again, the affinity between Campbell’s work an my own is evident, as the sub-title of my book, Resurrection and the Justification of God, indicates such a connection between the eschatological, life-giving act of God in Christ and the righteousness of God. Though Campbell will take this in a somewhat different direction. The affinity is particularly seen when Campbell talks about the importance of ζάω and its cognates as indications of “resurrection life,” especially throughout Rom 5-8 [686], and when he ties the notion to Rom 1:4 and a Christological reading of Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:17 [686]. Indeed, when Campbell goes on to say, “If interpreters approach Paul and Romans with ears freshly attuned to the importance and integration of Jesus’ messiahship, resurrection, and exaltation to lordship, then the textual surface of the letter begins to shift in some interesting new directions,” once an imagine that I nod in hearty agreement.)

As he works this out, Campbell appeals to Rom 1:1b-4 as the signal Paul gives as to his intention to connect such themes as God’s action and kingship throughout the letter: this is the story of Paul’s gospel (695-6). At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I say, Yes, this is what I’m on about–and why I argue that we need to take more seriously the function of letter openings in laying out the thesis/themes of Romans. These themes are then linked with God’s reconciliation of the world (Rom 5:1-11; cf. Unlocking Romans, 84-97); our own adoption as God’s children (Rom 8:15-17; cf. Unlocking Romans, 133-38); and Isaiah’s proclamation of Jesse’s seed in Rom 15:12 (cf. Unlocking Romans, 49-55) (696-7).

After combing through the letter as a whole, Campbell comes back to the messianic reading of Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:17b. Picking up on “the gospel” as defined in 1:1-4, and this Christological reading, “The letter’s auditors are thereby prompted to find some connection between the gospel (i.e., the announcement of the divine King’s good news through his appointed representative), Jesus’ resurrection, and God’s δικαιοσύνη (698).  Or, for those of you who prefer Kirk, “This conjunction of Paul’s gospel message, the resurrection of Jesus, and the justification of God is not a complex that we are left to assemble on the basis of Rom 1:2-4… We have as corroborating evidence what has often been read as the letter’s thesis statement [Rom 1:16-17]… There, Paul works out some further descriptions and implications of his gospel message–a message whose content he has already parsed in terms of Jesus’ resurrection-kingship… We therefore meet in 1:16-17 a parallel claim to that of 1:1-4: the gospel reveals God’s righteousness… God’s righteousness is unveiled, not in a general resurrection of the just… but in the resurrection of the one who showed his justice by becoming faithfully obedient unto death (Unlocking Romans, 46, 47).

Because in Rom 1:17 God is not judging or condemning Christ but raising him from the dead, Campbell suggests that “deliverance of God” is a nice approximation of Paul’s “righteousness of God” language.

Campbell does much in these passages to connect God’s own kingship with the kingship of God’s human representative. I think that this is well done and important, but perhaps overdone for the context in Romans. Yes, God is king, but is God’s deliverance tied to working out the function of saving, kingly power? Further, I think that Campbell too quickly skips past something like “covenant faithfulness” by not wrestling with the connection between raising Jesus from the dead and the scriptures of Israel. Ok, so maybe “covenant” is too specific, but “Israel-faithfulness” or “scriptural-faithfulness” seems to be a necessary component. Of whom is God king? What does it look like for this particular king to act justly? There are some under-developed angles of the context that I think shade the data in a slightly different direction.

As is clear from this discussion, Campbell’s reading and my own are on much the same track. One of the reasons I appreciated his reading of Romans so much is that he takes seriously the Christological narrative that determines the content of Paul’s descriptions of faith, righteousness, God, etc. His perception of the resurrection as a key component means that many of his arguments correlate well with ones I made or attempted to make in my own work. Thus, when I think of the reviewer who rather dismissively asked of my argument, “Does Hab 2:4 really refer to Jesus’ resurrection?” I can now say, “Yes, and now you have two of us to deal with.” I, of course, like that!

Next up: father Abraham.

Disclaimer: I received a free copy of Deliverance of God from the publisher, but with no stipulation either that I would review it or review it positively. I also received a free copy of Unlocking Romans, but you probably already knew that.

Obviously, in a book of 936 pages (plus a couple hundred pages of end-notes), one will find far too many areas of agreement and disagreement to outline thoroughly. In case you’re dying with the suspense, I’ll summarize with what is sure to be a huge disappointment to my readers: I agree with everyone else. The book is fantastic in its positive program of the apocalyptic reading, especially from Romans 3:20 onward, and unpersuasive in what precedes.

Having said that, I should also say that, should Campbell prove to be entirely right, it will lend further credibility to my thesis that resurrection is a primary key for making sense of Paul’s argument in Romans. (This will become more clear as I go on in this post and the next.) So, I would love for Campbell to be completely right. I’ll spend a couple days working through what I find  compelling before spending a day on critique.

For me, the good stuff starts on p. 601. This is where Campbell works out his program of “apocalyptic rereading” with a discussion of Rom 1:16-17 and 3:21-31. DAC rightly insists on reading these two passages together–a move that should only be augmented by making the same insistence about chs. 4 and 10, where the terminology is once again densely rehearsed.

Campbell provocatively, and largely correctly, insists that pistis in these passages be seen as something along the lines of fidelity, something even roughly equivalent to obedience. I wouldn’t go as far as DAC as to say that these are “interchangeable” (612), but I would agree that pistis is manifest in obedience, as Rom 1:5 makes clear.

Campbell argues that Rom 1:17 cites Hab 2:4 Christologically as an indication of Jesus’ death and resurrection (613). I had argued previously, “God’s righteousness is unveiled, not in a general resurrection of the just… but in the resurrection of the one who showed his justice by becoming faithfully obedient unto death… Rom 1:1-4 prepares the readers of the letter to interpret Hab 2:4 as a first demonstration of resurrection hermeneutics in the letter: the One who was righteous by faith now lives” (Unlocking Romans, 47). Campbell makes a similar connection between Rom 1:1-4 and 1:17 (615).

As he goes on, DAC also makes some compelling arguments about the nature of faith as fidelity toward God. Moreover, the Christological reading of pistis terminology provides the strongest basis for Paul’s language that God’s righteousness is revealed: it is truly revealed when Jesus comes and acts. When he turns to reread Rom 3:21-26, he insists on keeping hold of this “Christological key,” to good effect. Only a Christological reading of ek pisteos can make sense of Paul’s claim that Jesus is put forward as a hilasterion, by faith, in his blood.” How do ” by faith” and “in his blood” function as correlative modifiers of “sacrifice of atonement [or mercy seat]“? When they both connote the same reality of Jesus’ death on the cross.

As Campbell makes the argument for his reading of Rom 3:20-26, he musters some of the best evidence for pistis Christou to be read as a subjective genitive that I have yet seen. This section is worth its weight in gold.

As I argued in Unlocking Romans, so in Deliverance of God Campbell makes the point that Rom 1:2-4 creates the expectation among readers that Christ’s resurrection and enthronement are the keys to the narrative of Jesus we encounter in the book, an expectation affirmed when we see it worked out in Rom 1:17 and Hab 2:4 and picked up in Rom 4:25. Campbell builds on this facet of the letter to argue that “justification” has a liberative, resurrection sense even in 3:20-26. This is a compelling reading, one of those places where I sense that his project is making significant progress in our reading of Romans (656-65; 672ff.).

One facet of Campbell’s argument in this regard is his reading of Rom 6:7, where Paul says, “The one who died has been justified from sin.” He follows Robin Scroggs (as I did previously in Unlocking Romans, 113-14) in arguing that Christ is the subject here. He works out the liberative connotations of resurrection to further support his reading of justification along those lines. Both in adding his voice to the chorus of a Christological reading of 6:7 and in stretching our understanding of justification, Campbell provides rich fare for future exegesis of Romans.

Next time, we’ll continue analyzing the book’s strengths with a dip into Campbell’s arguments about “the righteousness of God” and about father Abraham.

Disclaimer: I received a free copy of Deliverance of God from the publisher, but with no stipulation either that I would review it or review it positively. I also received a free copy of Unlocking Romans, but you probably already knew that.

Although this was a short section, it was a good reminder that (a) there are some serious problems with the way Romans 1:16-17 is traditionally read; and (b) Campbell has some important alternatives to offer that should help shape the way we read Romans.

Of course, at this point in the book he’s simply assessing the weaknesses of the traditional position, but knowing where he’s going, at least in part, I’m once again eager for him to get there.

The most significant problem that Campbell highlights is this: whereas the traditional reading has interpreted human faith as the referent in 1:17, “…revealed from faith to faith,” this seems quite impossible. “By faith” here is not an indication of how we’re saved, but how God’s own righteousness is revealed. Something else must be in view.

And, whatever this “something else” is, it must make sense when read with Habakkuk 2:4, “The just shall live from faith.” I anticipate being quite happy with where this goes…

In general, I find in reading through this section that my fears from the earlier chapters are playing out. The critiques Campbell brings against “traditional” readings of Romans 1-3 are, in general, critiques of justification theory as he has presented it, coupled with the idea that Romans 1-3 has to be read in a particular way in order to uphold that theory.

The problem with this, as I mentioned earlier, is that I am not aware of anyone who holds to justification theory and its reading of Romans 1-3 in precisely the way that Campbell presents it. Or, perhaps I know of some people, but they’re not biblical scholars.

In my estimation, the “best” readings of Paul, and of Romans 1-3, recognize that, yes, Paul is what Campbell calls an “apocalyptic” thinker. Moreover, there is also a wide-spread estimation that though Rom 1-3 works as an argument that, in general, thinks “forwards,” rather than starting from the Christ event and reassessing everything else in its light, that these earlier passages still reflect Paul’s ex post facto thinking even though they are not making an ex post facto argument.

In short, there are numerous places where different ways of putting Paul’s argument together, or reframing our own estimation of what a tenable argument is, leaves those of us who haven’t come up with Campbell’s reading wondering who he is trying to dissuade of their own.

The other reason I am not finding the feet of the “traditional” reading so clay-like as the book would have me to is because the critiques leveled against the reading sometimes feel anachronistic. Is it really an argument against Paul to say that a would-be prophetic critique of non-Christian Judaism leaves “Judaism necessarily accused of depravity”? Maybe I’ve been spending too much time reading the OT Prophets recently, but such a criticism of an interpretation of Paul seems to be too dependent on modern sensibilities about what a person is or isn’t allowed to say about Judaism in light of the post-Jewish history of Christianity.

Put differently: Jewish prophets told the Jewish people in general that they were rebellious and depraved–even in their most pious acts of worship!–and that if they didn’t heed the voice of the prophet they were going to find themselves under God’s judgment. This might not always make them happy (cf. Habakkuk), but neither did it make them anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic, or the like. One might also compare the denunciations of the outsiders we find at Qumran.

Such parallels, one might argue, are no reason to think that Paul, who has a very different understanding of God’s work, is doing the same thing. Fair enough. But the parallels do show that there is no contradiction in Paul making the sort of arguments that, according to Campbell, are clear indications of “problems” in the traditional reading. My estimation is that these are greater problems for 21st century westerners than for a first century Jew.

Thus far, I continue to grow in my suspicions that the “straw man” critique is more or less fatal. There seems to be little reason for the wholesale reassessment Campbell has on offer. Without the exegetical problems, I see little need for a radical new solution. Yes, there are a few points at which some inconsistencies arise, a few places where a small problem or two should be hammered out.

In all, what I’m thinking as I run through the critique is that what’s needed is a robust articulation of justification within the union-with-Christ, ex post facto paradigm–not the radical reconceptualizing that awaits me on the future pages of DoG, but the position I wish Campbell had engaged with as he was making his proposal.

In my previous post, most excellent Theophilos, I wrote of all that Deliverance of God began to do and teach with respect to the Reformed Tradition and its combination of justification with a more elective understanding of salvation. Today I want to follow up with some more concerns about the presence of both strands in this tradition. Mostly, I want to suggest that in holding onto both strands the Reformers might be imitating Paul, Judaism, and the Old Testament.

I’ll pass quickly by the possibility that justification and election are mutually informing in Paul, because I’m sure that we’ll get to this in the exegetical sections. But in the back of my mind I’m thinking, “Those whom he foreknew he also predestined to become conformed to the image of his son; and whom he foreknew these he also called, whom he called these he also justified; whom he justified these he also glorified.” In Romans 8, not only do predestination and justification come together, they come together in an eschatological (already/not yet) context entirely conditioned both by union with the dead and resurrected Jesus and the coming final judgment in which justification will be realized. We might similarly ask about Gal 3 where reception of the Spirit and justification by faith are mutually inclusive rather than representative of divergent soteriologies.

But as I said, I’ll hold back judgment on these Pauline matters for the time being, assuming they’ll be covered in due course.

The second issue that keeps springing to mind in this regard, however, is that of early Judaism.

Now I know that on many of these issues you don’t think Ed Sanders has gotten things as straight as needs be. Fair enough. But one thing he said around the seminar table has stuck with me and resonated as true to much of early Jewish literature: “Paul believed both in predestination and free will, and so did the other Jews of the first century. Do you know what the Qumran community called themselves? The elect. You know what else they called themselves? The volunteers!”

It seems more than a little likely to me that what we consider theological contradiction a first century Jew might consider paradox or mystery. This is one reason I’m less than eager to base my assessment of Paul on an idealized reconstruction of theories. I’m not persuaded that our only other option is to relegate Paul to the realm of contradiction and confusion.

Both/and might be an alternative to either/or.

I was already pondering these things in my heart when I stumbled across the following from Walter Brueggemann. He discusses the OT, delving into YHWH’s identity as it is tied to the people of Israel. When talking about the covenants, he bids us not press the distinction between “conditional” and “unconditional” covenants.

On the whole, however, in my judgment it is futile and misleading to sort out unconditional and conditional aspects of YHWH’s covenant with Israel. The futility and misleading quality of such an enterprise can be stated on two quite different grounds. First, even the covenant with the ancestors of Genesis includes and imperative dimension…Second, if this relationship is indeed one of passionate commitment, as it surely is, it is undoubtedly the case that every serious, intense, primary relationship has within its dimensions of conditionality and unconditionality that play in different ways in different circumstances. The attempt to factor out conditional and unconditional aspects of the covenant is an attempt to dissect and analyze the inscrutable mystery of an intimate, intense relation that, by definition, defies all such disclosure. (An Unsettling God, 24)

Much of the argument depends on the inherent incompatibility between what are assessed as two ways of thinking. I’m wrestling with this idea, now, from a couple of different angles: (1) are these ways of thinking inherently incompatible as claimed? (2) is there any reason to think Paul would have thought so–or are there good reasons to think he might not have? and (3) what about the actual theories that have held the two elements together? where do they fall apart?

The weight of the coming argument about Romans is going to rest, in large measure, on the power of the division. Am I asking for more prolegomena?! Maybe just different…

I thought you did a very good job laying out the building blocks of interpreting a text. In particular, there were three important pieces you brought to the table. One was that we need to read things such that they make sense within a flow of an argument (at least, that should be our preference). The other was to make us step back and start to think through whether a word or set of words might have a very different set of connotations in the first century than they do in the sixteenth.

The third piece was one that I especially resonated with, and that was the often unacknowledged power of the system on the lower layers of theological interpretation. This gets ramped up in any number of ways (including saying that ‘the gospel’ is at stake)–all of which are question begging. Having spent far too much of my life trying to have biblical-exegetical questions in the conservative Reformed world, I can testify to the fact that the concern to allow the text to speak, and the danger that it will become a dummy to the system’s ventriloquist is not a bogeyman but the reality of a large and growing swath of American conservative Reformed Christianity (how’s that for a series of qualifiers?!).

I am very glad that you put all these issues on the table.

But I wasn’t happy with the investigations into Luther and Calvin. Not that you aren’t right about the things they say, but that I’m not sure you’ve dealt the the looming objection to your project.

If I understand you correctly, your point is that Luther and Calving both contain “mixed” systems. They promote the system of “justification theory” as you outline it, and they also promote a system of election, depravity, etc.

Why didn’t I find this helpful? First, it seemed that if this was all you need to say, it could have been dispensed with in one sentence: “Yes, the two things you associate with Calvinism are both present in the Reformers; i.e., justification theory and that series of doctrines tied to predestination/election.” Calvinism in my worlds typically connotes TULIP or something close to it. That it’s present in Calvin is not all that significant.

The more important argument that needs to be addressed is not whether both dynamics are present, but how they are related. Thus, for example, you cite Institutes 3.1.1, where Calvin talks about the need for the Holy Spirit to unite us to Christ, as an example of the latter, “alternative”/participatory theory. But you’ve also talked about his later discussions of justification as embodying what you call “justification theory.”

But what you haven’t done is to get into Calvin’s system and see how these two are related; you haven’t delved into how, in fact, justification is subordinated to union with Christ soteriology! This is the great argument the Reformed Tradition has to make against your project, not simply that both elements are present in both Paul and the Tradition, but that they are fit together into a coherent system.

Under your justification theory, there’s no way to integrate the two, but Calvin has done so. Now, he might be confused, but he still needs to be addressed (it seems to me). For example: under your understanding of justification theory, Calvin is bound to place justification fully within the free choice of a non-regenerate person. But why is it that he not only takes up justification after union with Christ (3.1.1.) but even after sanctification?! For a Reformer, this might seem to be selling the farm on justification. But Calvin can do this because it’s a function or facet of his union with Christ soteriology.

In my estimation, the only way to make a compelling case against the Reformers at this point is to show that their system must fall apart as its given. This has been my concern all along with your articulation of justification theory. Why must your articulation of the theory be correct? And does the fact that it is clearly not the justification theory of the Reformers (with the possible exception of Melanchthon) not take away some of the power from the argument?

We need to wrestle with a couple other points related to this: (1) what if such a mixed theory is Pauline? (2) what if in promoting a mixed theology of grace and choice Paul is simply reflecting the theological possibilities of early Judaism? and (3) what if in this early Judaism is accurately embodying the apparently mixed theology of the Old Testament?

I’ll outline those concerns in my next post.

Disclaimer: Eerdmans sent me a gratis copy of this book, but without the stipulation either that it would be reviewed or that it would be reviewed favorably.

Coming to the end of his first major section, “Justification Theory and Its Implications,” Campbell lays out some serious consequences for adopting Justification Theory. Important here is that in his view all these problems, or most of them at any rate, are built (wittingly or no) on the assumptions of justification theory.

And this is why I found this part of the book to be much less compelling than I had anticipated. In short: there is no way around these issues in the alternative apocalyptic theory, which, because of the concession DAC had to make earlier about its containing a God who judges the world, equally entails many of the most important consequences.

A further general reflection: I continue to be frustrated that DAC does not wrestle in this first part of the book with those theologians who have seen justification as a function of Paul’s union with Christ soteriology. No doubt Campbell will get to these at the end, when he deals with other key texts, but every time he makes these hard and fast distinctions–insisting not only that they are logically necessary but the antinomy Paul himself is working with, I think, “What about, ‘seeking to be justified in Christ‘ in Gal 2?” Or, “So how about righteousness that comes through union with Christ and faith in Phil 3?” Of course, there’s also the massive problem of Romans 5 that mixes the models so extensively that people debate whether Rom 5 is the end of 1-4 or the beginning of 5-8.

But what about the “problems” that the alternative theory can’t avoid?

First, I need to reiterate that Campbell must concede that the God of retributive justice, the God who is judge and will judge the world, is ubiquitous in Paul, not confined to the justification texts. “Paul does occasionally endorse punitive action by God, and this even if his vision of the eschaton is not always consistent. This is a small vein of evidence in his texts, but I concede that it is there; Paul’s thinking at this point is not unalloyed” (94).

To my mind, this concession critically blunts the argument of much of the book, because Campbell is going on to argue that just the kind of God who does not exercise retributive justice, etc. is really Paul’s God and one who gets us out of all sorts of difficulties. But such a God is not to be found in Paul’s soteriological narrative.

Here are some “problems” that the alternative theory can, therefore, not alleviate:

Post-Holocaust Perspectives (p. 205). Campbell suggests that since Justification Theory (“JT”) leaves those on the outside highly culpable for their actions, including receiving God’s wrath on the day of judgment, that it tacitly endorses this-worldly violence against outsiders, most notably Jews. But since Paul’s God is always one who inflicts wrath on the day of judgment, and since even the apocalyptic Paul does not give much evidence of a numerically universal salvation, the alternative does not get us very far. Yes, anti-Judaism is a huge problem. No, introducing a disjunction between “apocalyptic” and “JT” is not the way forward.

Homosexual Relations (p. 206-7). Paul’s sexual ethics are as often derived from union with Christ soteriology as they are from the “natural theology” of Romans 1. 1 Cor 6 is a case in point, and Campbell concedes that this shows up in Paul’s vice lists. Putting Rom 1 into someone else’s voice might help the pro-homosexuality argument, but it does not make Paul’s “real God” a supporter of that particular expression of sexuality.

Constantinianism (207). I agree that Constantinianism is bad. I agree that it gets the story wrong. But the way forward cannot simply be abandoning JT for apocalyptic, because (see the concession on p. 94) both views maintain a God of judgment, who avenges the wrong. There has to be another way to get our story straight…

Totalizing metanarratives (208-9). Simply put, it’s hard for me to imagine a more totalizing metanarrative than the apocalyptic one! The whole point of Rom 5:12ff. is to move the narrative of Israel’s God from the realm circumscribed by the Law to the entire human race and even to the whole cosmos with its powers of sin and death!

Other systematic theological issues depend on a minimalist account of JT. This is another point at which DAC’s interaction with his own construal of JT rather than actual advocates of it creates a barrier in my conceding his argument. Is JT really less Trinitarian, pneumatologically deficient, sacramental? Only if you give the thinnest possible account. Someone might argue that Gal 3 ties pneumatology inseparably to justification by faith as an integral part of the saving process. One might argue that the Reformed ordo salutis that places effectual calling (and union with Christ!) before justification shows how the Spirit is intimately connected to the soteriological process in justification, etc.

In all, I found myself leaving section 1 thinking that the difficulties for justification theory were much less than DAC wants us to think, and that apocalyptic is much less free from the difficulties than Campbell’s alternate theory requires.

Up next: Part 2, “Hermeneutical Clarifications”

Disclaimer: I received a gratis copy of this book from Eerdmans, though with no stipulations either that I would review it or review it favorably.